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Notable Legislation of 1962
HIaRy L. SNEAD, JR.

Unless otherwise indicated, the statutes and amendments
noted below will be effective on June 29, 1962. All code references are to the 1950 Code of Virginia.
AGENCY:
-When Death Does Not Terminate Agent's Authority
Section 55-56.1, a new section, makes a radical change
in the law of agency by providing that where the agent or
third party has acted in good faith, death of the principal
does not terminate an agency created by written power of
attorney until there is actual notice or knowledge of the
principal's death.
The new statute was probably intended to aid title examiners because it further provides that an affidavit of nonknowledge of death of the principal may be recorded and, in
the absence of fraud, the affidavit shall be conclusive proof
of the non-revocation or termination of the agent's authority.
The exception as to "fraud", although desirable, tends to
diminish the beneficial effect of the statute; the risk of possible fraud is substituted for the risk of the unknown death
of the principal.
A draftsman is permitted to over-ride the statute and provide in the power of attorney that death revokes or terminates
the agency.
Good faith is required; parties who relied on an extremely
ancient written power of attorney would be acting in bad
faith; life is of limited duration.
CRIMINAL LAW:
-Implied Consent To Blood Test
This well-publicized statute may be found in Sections 18.1320
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55, 18.1-59, and 46.1-430.1. Its effective date is July 1, 1962.
Briefly, the statute, which is bottomed on the palpable,
odious, noxious, and uomecessary fiction that by driving on
the highway one has consented to a blood test, operates as
follows:
If the test be consented to by the accused the arresting
officer must take the accused promptly to a person competent
to extract the blood. Where practicable, this person "shall"
be a physician of the accused's choice. The sample is placed
in each of two containers and both "shall" be sealed in the
presence of the accused. One sample is delivered to the
accused, the other to the officer; the sample delivered to the
officer is tested by the Office of the State Medical Examiner;
the sample given to the accused may be tested by a laboratory
which has met certain requirements specified in the statute.
If the test be consented to or requested within two hours
after arrest and is thereafter conducted but the results are not
introduced at the trial for any reason (other than conduct
of the accused) the accused must be found not guilty. Further,
failure of the Commonwealth to strictly comply with any of
the requirements of the section shall create a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt.
Upon arrest it is the officer's duty to advise the accused
of the availability of the test and the consequences of failure
to submit to the test. If the accused refuses, he is then taken
before a committing justice who once again must advise him
as to the law and the penalty for his refusal. The accused
may consent to or request the test or the accused may then
declare his refusal in writing on a form provided by the
magistrate; the information which must be on the form again
reminds the accused of his rights and the penalty for refusal
to take the test. This must take place within two hours after
the alleged offense.
If the accused signs the declaration of refusal no blood
test is taken. The signed declaration of refusal is attached
to a warrant (a copy of the warrant must be given to the
accused) and both are .forwarded to the court in which the
offense of driving under the influence will be tried.
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If the accused fails to sign the declaration of refusal (and
fails to take the test) the committing magistrate certifies in
a signed writing both the fact of refusal and that he advised
the accused that such refusal, if found to be unreasonable,
constituted grounds for revocation. This certification is attached to a warrant (a copy of the warrant must be given to
the accused) and both are -forwarded to the court in which the
offense of driving under the influence will be tried.
The trial for failure to submit to the blood test shall be
fixed at a date subsequent to the trial for driving under the
influence.
Failure of the accused to submit to the blood test is not
evidence in and shall not be subject to comment during the
trial for driving under the influence.
The penalty for unreasonable refusal to take the test is
ninety days suspension of license for the first offense and
six months for a subsequent offense or refusal within one
year of the effective date of any prior refusal.
If the accused be found guilty of both driving under the
influence and refusal to submit to a blood test the periods of
suspension shall run consecutively, not concurrently.
Doubtless the statute will undergo severe testing by litigation. Many points are not clear. For example, does the officer
at the time of arrest have to advise the accused that he may
refuse to take the test if he has reasonable ground for such
refusal? What constitutes a reasonable ground for refusal to
take the test?
-Banking and Secured Transactions-No Charge for Substitution or Change of Insurance Policies
Sale of property insurance by lending institutions or their
"agents" is a large and profitable business. In an effort to
curb the growing trickle of insurance business being enticed
away by independent insurers some lenders had begun to
make charges for substituting and changing insurance policies.
A new statute, Section 38.1-31.3, provides that neither a
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lender secured by property nor "a trustee, director, officer,
agent, or other employee" of such lender shall "directly or
indirectly" require that a borrower pay a consideration to
substitute insurance on the property nor shall they make any
charge (other than premium) for any change in the "kind,
type, or amount" of such insurance. Violation of the statute
is made a misdemeanor.
Does the statute apply to a lending institution which operates its insurance business through a closely controlled separate corporate entity?
-Contracts-Acceptance of CertainPromissory Notes for
Food Made a Misdemeanor
The hardship caused by the insolvency of a "food plan"
concern precipitated the enactment of House Bill 128 which
makes it a misdemeanor for a retailer to accept in payment of
food a promissory note for an amount in excess of twice the
sale price of food delivered to the buyer. "Delivered" is defined to mean "physical delivery to the customer within
seven days of the receipt of the note by the seller."
The effect of the statute is to eliminate discounting of longterm promissory notes for food plans as a means of financing
the beginning or operation of such businesses.
DIVORCE:
-Significant Changes in Three Years Separation As
Ground For Divorce
Section 20-91(9) has been amended so as to make three
years separation a more meaningful and usable ground -for
divorce. After the effective date of the amendment the parties
need not have been residents and domiciliaries of this state
at the inception of the separation and a spouse domiciled in
Virginia may use an order of publication against a spouse
residing or domiciled in another state.
An important and bothersome point of law was resolved by
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the addition of a sentence stating that, "A plea of res
adjudicata or of recrimination with respect to any other
provision of this section [20-91] shall not be a bar to either
party obtaining a divorce on this ground [three years separation]."
Separation as a ground for divorce is commented upon extensively elsewhere in this issue of the Law Notes.
-Restriction on Power of Court in Divorce ProceedingsTo
Decree Regarding Property of Husband and Wife
In the 1960 issue of the Law Notes a suggestion was made
that under Section 20-107 trial courts had authority not only
to partition jointly owned property in a divorce proceeding
but to effect a property division as well. Snead, Alimony,
Property Division and the Modern-Day Wife. U. of Richmond Law Notes 242, 249-251 (1961).
The suggestion there made has been nullified by an amendment to Section 20-107 which provides that the wordI"estate"
as used in that section "shall be construed to mean only those
rights of the parties created by the marriage in and to the
real property of each other." Apparently this amendment
makes into law the dictum in Gum v. Gum, 122 Va. 32, 94 S.E.
177 (1917) wherein it was said that the "estate" to be dealt
with by the divorce court was in the nature of dower and
curtesy.
Smith v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 104 S.E. (2d) 17 (1958), in
which the divorce court was permitted to partition jointly
owned realty, is probably no longer law.
INSURANCE:
-Period of Incontestibility Made Uniform
Section 38.1-438 was amended to make the period of incontestability of life insurance policies begin two years after
the date of the policy. Prior to this amendment some policies
had a one year period of contestability, while others had a two
year period of contestability.
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SECURED TRANSACTIONS:
-Endorsee Or Assignee Competent Party To Obtain Marginal lelease
An amendment to Section 55-66.3 makes it clear that "an
endorsee or assignee, whether general or restrictive, of a note,
bond or other evidence of debt" is a competent party to obtain a marginal release.

SALES AND TORTS:
-Lack of Privity Abolished As Defense to CertainSellers
and Manufacturers
With a suddenness and lack of controversy which surprised
even the proponents of the bill, the General Assembly passed
House Bill 389 which abolished lack of privity as a defense
to certain sellers and manufacturers of goods who are sued
for negligence or breach of warranty. There are only two
limitations apparent on the face of the bill: the plaintiff
must have been a person whom the seller or manufacturer
might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods, and the section does not have application
to any litigationpending at its effective date.
Counsel are hereby cautioned not to institute any action
for negligence or breach of warranty in which privity might
be a defense until after the effective date of the act.
This far reaching, probably unprecedented, statute nullifies
many Virginia cases and races to a conclusion which the Virginia Court might have been decades in reaching.
TORTS:
-Time Within Which Notice of Tort Must be Given City or
Town Extended in CertainCases
Section 8-653 was amended to provide that if an injured
person bringing an action against a city or town establishes
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by clear and convincing evidence that the injury he received
prevented him from giving notice within sixty days, then
the time for giving notice shall be tolled until the claimant
sufficiently recovers from the injury so as to be able to give
such notice.
An interesting question which is likely to arise is not
answered by the amendment: Suppose the claimant's injury
does not manifest itself in disabling fashion until, say, ten
days after the injury? Does the statute apply and, if so,
would the claimant have fifty days or sixty days after his
"recovery" within which the give notice ?
-Maximum Recovery For Death By Wrongful Act Increased
An amendment to Section 8-636, authorizes the jury to
award a maximum of thirty-five thousand dollars in death
by wrongful act actions. This is an increase of five thousand
dollars over the previous maximum.
The amended statute does not expressly restrict this increased recovery to causes of action arising after the effective
date of the amendment (as was done when the 1958 amendment increased the maximum recovery from twenty-five to
thirty thousand dollars). One may expect controversy over
whether the increased maximum applies to causes of action
arising prior to the effective date of the amendment.
TRUSTS:
-Sequence of Execution of Instrumentsin Pour-OverTrust
In the last issue of the Law Notes the suggestion was made
that, due to the absence of an existing res at the time of
execution of the trust instrument, many existing pour-over
trusts were subject to attacks on their validity. Wiltshire,
Pour-Over Devise or Bequest To Life Insurance Trust-Sequence of Execution of Papers,1 U. of Richmond Law Notes
221 at 225-229 (1961).
One of the major amendments to the "pour-over" statute
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(Section 64-71.1) has resolved this question by providing that
"an unfunded insurance trust shall be deemed established
upon the execution of the instrument creating such trust."
Thus a draftsman, with safety, may execute the trust agreement prior to the time he has legally and effectually established the trustee as beneficiary of the insurance policy or
policies.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES:
-Payment of Certain Small Sums Due Persons Upon
Whose Estate There Has Been No Qualification
An amendment to Section 64-119 has raised from three
hundred dollars to one thousand dollars the sum which may
by paid to a surviving consort by the State or the United
States for burial expenses without there being qualification
on the estate of the decedent.
-When No Surety Required On Refunding Bond Given In
Settlement of Estate of Person Presumed Dead
Section 64-108, as amended, dispenses with surety on the
refunding bond given in administration of the estate of a
person presumed dead when the evidence shows the length
of absence of the supposed decedent to be more than fifteen
years. Prior to the amendment a surety was not dispensed
with unless the supposed decedent had been absent more than
thirty years.
-Taxation - Change in Method of Computing Taxable
Estate When Realty Owned Jointly
Effective as to persons dying on or after July 1, 1964,
single family dwellings jointly owned by husband and wife
with survivorship and used as their homeplace shall be accorded a different tax treatment: For the purposes of inheritance taxation, no more than one-half the value of such
dwelling need be included in the taxable estate of the decedent.
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The amendment also contains a limitation on the deduction
of any mortgage or deed of trust outstanding against such
property. See Section 58-153, as amended.
-Beneficiary of Life InsurancePolicy Not Entitled To Proceeds If Murdered Insured
An amendment to Section 64-18 provides that a beneficiary
who has been convicted of murdering the insured shall not
be entitled to receive payment under any insurance policy on
the life of such insured; the proceeds of the policy are to be
paid to such other persons as are named in the policy, or if
none, to the estate of the insured.
An insurance company which pays "without notice of the
circumstances" which make the statute applicable does not
have to pay again. There is a likelihood that this latter provision will lead to a change in the manner of paying claims,
or litigation, or both.
-Trustee Appointed By Will Can Be A Competent Witness
Section 64-54 was amended to provide that a trustee appointed by a will can be a competent witness for or against
the will.
The amendment removes any doubt as to the competency
of trustees. Formerly the statute applied to executors only.
-Diminution of Estate Which Vests Absolutely in Widow,
Minor Children, and Unmarried Daughters of Decendent
Householder
Heretofore, Section 64-121 gave to the widow, minor children, or unmarried daughters of a decedent householder an
absolute estate in that property which would be exempt under
[the "poor debtor's" exemption (Section 34-26) and the
"farmer's" exemption (Section 34-27).
The amendment to Section 64-121 does away with this estate
of the widow, minor children, or unmarried daughters where
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such decedent has a net estate of one thousand dollars or
more.
Quite possibly the proponents of the amendment had in
mind remedying a situation in which a widow claimed and
was entitled to the exempt property and the net estate of
a decedent.
The cure offered may be worse than the ill; in varying
contexts the statute as amended could operate very arbitrarily and unfairly and therefore could be attacked on the
constitutional grounds of lack of due process and equal protection. For example, were a widowed householder to die
leaving behind him infant children and a will which bequeathed his net estate of $1000.00 to some third person then
the amended statute would deny these infants even the small
claim against their father's estate formerly created by unamended Section 64-121. However, the infant children of a
widowed father who left them his entire net estate of $999.99
would be entitled to claim the exempt property as well.
True, the exempt property is "peanuts" but even peanuts
should be parceled out with fairness.
The framer's difficulty in injecting monetary limitations
into the amendment is compounded because Section 64-121
seems to serve a dual purpose: It protects certain persons
from being completely disinherited by giving them an absolute estate in certain property of the householder and at
the same time it places that property beyond the reach of
creditors of the decedent householder.

